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1 Characteristics of Real Science and Real Scientific Controversy 
Science is more of a journey than a destination.  And, as to be expected of any journey 
taken by diverse travellers to an unexplored place, there may arise disagreements over 
how to get there, what is seen, and what it all means.  If the place is relatively 
unimportant and the number of travellers few, the discord rarely spreads far.  But if the 
destination is important, the travellers are many, and the outcome of getting there (or not) 
is consequential, disagreements can escalate into a broadly sweeping controversy with a 
lot at stake.   
 Some 25 years ago, I had the pleasure of contributing an invited paper (M P 
Silverman, 1992, “Raising Questions: Philosophical Significance of Controversy in 
Science”, Science & Education 1: 163-179) to the inaugural volume of this journal on the 
provocative topic of the significance of controversy in science.  The article was based in 
part on a course I was teaching—Role and Resolution of Controversy in Science—since 
about 1987.  One objective of this course was to counter what I perceived at the time to 
be an unhealthy tendency of the public to accept uncritically the daily reports in the news 
media of scientific advances.  What made that tendency societally unhealthy in my view 
was (a) news reports of such advances were often premature, inaccurate, or totally 
false—a state of affairs effectively (and hilariously) highlighted in recent times by 
“philosopher-comedian” John Oliver (Scientific Studies: Last Week Tonight, HBO, 8 
May 2016); and (b) the misunderstanding by the public that scientific knowledge was 
certain and unassailable.   In the opening words of my 1992 article:   
 
Turn on the radio; hear the announcer report: “Scientists have found that…”; and 
you can be sure that one more seemingly unimpeachable fact has entered the 
mainstream of public belief. 
 
 Much has changed in the past quarter century.  Today, with the veritable torrent of 
(mis)information coursing through networks of social media, as well as traditional 
journalism, the position of much of the public (at least in the US, if not also elsewhere) in 
regard to science has reversed itself.  My concern today is that much of the public, 
deluged by contradictory assertions by presumed authorities and handicapped by a 
deteriorating public educational system that teaches science too late and badly, cannot 
distinguish real science from nonsense, and so distrusts any science as transient and 
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unreliable. This reversal in public acceptance of valid scientific findings has 
accompanied, and indeed helped foster, the evolution of a very different kind of scientific 
controversy.  These are pseudo-controversies manufactured by entities with vested 
interests having little to do with the discovery or elucidation of scientific principles or the 
objective examination of scientific phenomena. It is this dark side of scientific 
controversy that has been explored in trenchant practical detail by historians Naomi 
Oreskes and Erik Conway (Merchants of Doubt:  How a Handful of Scientists Obscured 
the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, Bloomsbury, NY, 2010) 
and from an academic perspective by philosopher David Harker, whose book is the 
subject of this review.    
 To put into perspective what characterises a legitimate (in contrast to a contrived) 
scientific controversy, here is an illustration drawn from a very recent controversy in 
nuclear physics.  The point at issue is the rate at which radioactive nuclei decay.  To the 
layman it may seem that this topic is one of those relatively unimportant “destinations”.  
However, that would be a seriously errant judgment.  Radioactive elements are found all 
throughout the Earth, other planets, the asteroids, and the stars—and are freshly 
generated and dispersed into the cosmos when stars explode.  They are the energy source 
for a molten Earth core and mantle, leading to volcanism, mobility of the continents, and 
other geologic processes.  Their rates of decay provide the clocks for dating the age of the 
Solar System, the age of the Earth, the evolution of life on Earth, and for demonstrating 
(one of many lines of evidence) that the rising carbon concentration in the Earth’s 
atmosphere is due primarily to human activity. In short, the rates at which radioactive 
nuclei decay affect virtually all natural sciences from astrophysics to zoology—and has 
societal implications insofar as it impacts cultural and religious beliefs. 
 In the approximately one hundred years following the discovery of radioactivity, 
physicists and chemists established through numerous experiments that the rate of decay 
of a radioactive sample is (a) a constant intrinsic to each nuclear species and (b) 
unaffected by the environment (e.g. temperature, pressure, light, etc.). Ernest Rutherford, 
whose investigations of radioactivity were seminal to the development of nuclear physics, 
referred to these properties as the “law of radioactive change”.  During the past 10 years, 
however, there have been challenges by diverse researchers who claimed that strange 
emissions from the Sun affect the decay rates of radioactive nuclei here on Earth, 150 
million km from the Sun.  As a participant drawn to the controversy by a broad 
involvement in the study of radioactive nuclei spanning nearly 20 years, I can say that, if 
valid, these observations were inexplicable within the framework of the laws of physics 
as they are currently understood (M P Silverman, 2014, A Certain Uncertainty: Nature’s 
Random Ways, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984). The resolution of the 
controversy (at least for the present) occurred last year (M P Silverman, 2016, “Search 
for Anomalies in the Decay of Radioactivity Mn-54”, Europhysics Letters 114: 62001 1-
6).  A detailed examination of what would have been a particularly vulnerable nucleus 
(Manganese-54) if the Sun’s influence on nuclear decay was real, showed no violation of 
the law of radioactive change, but rather exquisite agreement with predictions of standard 
nuclear physics.  A highlighting of this work by the Institute of Physics was one 
communal recognition that the controversy was probably laid to rest (Hamish Johnston, 
PhysicsWorld.com 27 July 2016). 
 For purposes of comparison with what is to follow shortly concerning the problem 
of contrived controversies, it is of interest to ask these questions: (a) What created this 
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controversy?  (b) Why was it resolvable?  (c) What could reopen it? The answers are 
reasonably straightforward.  The controversy originated and evolved when various 
groups obtained results in disaccord with expectations based on previously well-
established principles. The controversy was resolvable because a comprehensive, 
quantitative, theoretical analysis of carefully acquired data, that could have revealed such 
anomalies at a level 10 times lower than what was claimed to have been observed, found 
no such effects at all.   And last, to continue the controversy in view of the preceding 
outcome, those who would still claim that the established physical law is wrong, must 
first explain why their observations cannot be attributable to instrumental artifacts, and 
why these perceived anomalies were not seen by the more sensitive tests conducted 
recently. 
 Underlying the foregoing considerations is an essential component whose general 
importance and relevance to the subject of controversy in science I cannot emphasise too 
strongly:   Physics is a real science.  A real science is a tightly constrained intellectual 
structure. It requires a broadly applicable self-consistent base of laws/concepts/principles 
amenable to comprehensive, reproducible experimental verification by well-understood 
and reliable procedures and instrumentation.   I will go further.  Not only is physics a real 
science, but nothing that conflicts with the laws of physics or is conceptually 
disconnected from the laws of physics can be a real science.  A discipline, for example, 
whose content is determined by a referendum of participants, and which can change 
according to the political tenor of the times, is not a science.  A discipline whose 
fundamental principles are primarily qualitative, open to a wide spectrum of 
interpretation, and whose supporting phenomena are not amenable to decisive, 
reproducible, empirical recognition or confirmation, is not a science.  In this regard, it is 
worth noting that the American Anthropological Association decided that anthropology is 
not a science (Nicholas Wade, “Anthropology a Science?”, www.nytimes.com 
/2010/12/10/science/10anthropology.html).  This is a point to keep in mind if one were to 
delve into the current controversy over the human status of Neanderthals.  
 The insistence that a discipline be like physics to be a science is not a rhetorical 
statement nor expression of occupational chauvinism.  Rather, without a solid base of 
self-consistent empirically verified quantitatively testable principles, a purportedly 
scientific controversy can be little more than an argument over semantics and personal 
opinions and biases.  
 In Creating Scientific Controversies [CSC], the author devotes a lot of space—
indeed more than one half the book—to discussing what he and other philosophers think 
science is.  There is the usual nod to Karl Popper and falsifiability and to Thomas Kuhn 
and paradigm shifts; a lot of theorising about what theories are; and deliberations over 
reasoning and cognitive biases.   Given that the author (a philosopher) has allocated about 
150 pages to what science is, and that I (a physicist) have defined a real science in about 
two sentences, I suspect we would differ significantly as to which fields of study to admit 
into the “temple of science”1.    
 
 
                                                
1 The phrase is taken from Einstein’s speech (“In the temple of science are many mansions…”) 
before the German Physical Society in 1918, celebrating the 60th birthday of Max Planck. From 
my own reading of Einstein’s papers, I infer that he would be very particular about what sciences 
occupied those “mansions”. 
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2 Characteristics of a Contrived Controversy 
The principal theme of CSC—how to detect created controversies—begins with an 
outline of utilitarian guidelines in Chapter 7.  Although brief, and in some cases obvious, 
the discussion is not uninformative to readers who have had little experience in scientific 
matters.  Foremost among the signposts is the question of motive—or, to put the matter 
more succinctly than the author:  “Follow the money”2.  As documented scrupulously by 
Oreskes and Conway in Merchants of Doubt [MOD], the controversies over the scientific 
evidence that tobacco smoke causes cancer, or that human activities involving the 
combustion of fossil fuels abet climate change, have far less to do with uncertainties in 
the underlying science than with financial losses and gains among instigators of the 
controversies.   Money enters in two ways:  (a) losses anticipated by companies who fear 
that scientific evidence against their product would lead to tighter regulations, and (b) 
gains to certain prominent individuals, in particular scientists, hired as advocates by the 
companies.   It is category (b) that I regard as especially worrisome.  An ordinary 
intelligent citizen does not need a PhD in physics to figure out that Philip Morris or 
Exxon Mobil would do everything possible to promote their products.   However, when 
one of the foremost architects of a disingenuous programme to create uncertainty in the 
scientific process in order to paralyse remedial actions by government turns out to be a 
former president of the US National Academy of Sciences [NAS], how is a layman 
supposed to process that?    
 The strongest ethical bond that makes science as a collective activity even 
possible is trust.  As a physicist, my initial reaction, when reading another scientist’s 
published paper, is to believe that errors, if I find any, were unintentional.  Regrettably, 
there are instances in science where an entire paper is created for purposes of deception.  
MOD recounts the egregious case involving former NAS president Fred Seitz who, 
together with another scientist, composed and circulated “a lengthy piece challenging 
mainstream climate science, formatted to look like a reprint from the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences.” [MOD, p 244]   I was one of the scientists to whom 
Seitz’s “PNAS paper” was sent.  When I realised that no such paper was actually 
published in PNAS, I knew from that moment on not to trust climate research by Seitz 
and his collaborators.   
 A second strategy advanced in CSC is to rely on scientific consensus.  In other 
words, the layman must try to ascertain what a majority of scientists with the expertise to 
understand the issues in question believe is correct.  This can be an informative way to 
proceed, but consensus is not simply a matter of numbers—even if the numbers quantify 
supposed experts.  The problem arises acutely in the controversy over climate change.  
As a scientist who investigates climate change from the novel perspective of making 
underground temperature measurements (M P Silverman, 2014, “Statistical Analysis of 
Subsurface Diffusion of Solar Energy with Implications for Urban Heat Stress”, Journal 
of Modern Physics 5: 751-762) that complement the more familiar land–, sea–, and 
satellite–based methods, I have frequently made reference in invited lectures to the 
widely publicised 2013 study (J Cook et al., 2013, “Quantifying the consensus on 
anthropogenic global warming in the scientific literature”, Environ. Res. Lett. 8: 024024 
1-7) claiming that about 97% of some 12,000 peer-reviewed scientific studies of climate 
                                                
2 The phrase was popularised by the docu-drama All The President’s Men, and is thought to 
derive from the informant who revealed the Watergate Scandal. 
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change comprise a consensus that human activity drives global warming.  A not atypical 
response by one or two people in the audience is to invoke statistics claiming large 
numbers (usually in the tens of thousands) of climate experts deny anthropogenic climate 
change.  This does not necessarily mean they deny that climate is changing; rather, they 
believe such variability is “natural” and not induced or significantly affected by human 
activity.   
 
 How, then, is a layman to distinguish credible from unreliable experts? An 
obvious method—although by no means necessarily easy for a layman to implement—is 
to accept as credible experts those who publish original research in peer-reviewed 
journals devoted to their claimed field of expertise.   According to CSC [p 193]:  “In fact, 
the peer-reviewed literature quickly dispels with [sic] all the objections, and many more.”   
Well…not quite.  While potentially helpful, this strategy may fail for a very simple 
reason.  The contrarians in a controversy, whose papers are almost always rejected by the 
establishment reviewers, can very well start their own journals or publish their own 
books, a reaction greatly facilitated by the rise of online open-access publishing.  The 
controversy over “cold fusion”, not discussed in CSC, provides one such example.  First 
reported by two electrochemists in the late 1980s, the discussion and investigation of the 
phenomenon went “viral” (to use the jargon of the internet age).  After close examination 
by nuclear physicists with appropriate instrumentation and expertise, the claim of 
chemical-assisted nuclear fusion in a room-temperature electrolytic cell was ultimately 
rejected by the physics community.  Nevertheless, there is a diehard group of researchers 
who continue to publish their “discoveries” in a field that a consensus of physicists has 
dismissed as “pathological science”.  (See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_fusion) 
 If the quantity of supporting experts and their weight of literary output are 
insufficient to establish whom to believe in a purportedly scientific controversy, what 
else remains? I offer this suggestion (with a cautionary reminder to follow):  When faced 
with a scientific controversy involving a real science, it is a good bet to go with the 
conclusions of the principal professional organisation(s) that represent that science.  If, 
for example, I did not have the expertise to read and understand the papers in Nature, 
Science, and numerous other internationally regarded periodicals in which climate 
research is published, I would seek the policy position of the American Physical Society 
[APS] (https://www.aps.org/policy/statements/07_1.cfm): 
The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring….While there are 
factors driving the natural variability of climate…no known natural mechanisms 
have been proposed that explain all of the observed warming in the past century.  
My reasoning would be: (a) Physics is a mature real science whose theoretical and 
experimental content can usually be trusted.  (b) A major international organisation of 
physicists like the APS is unlikely to be beholden to special interests.  (c) Therefore, the 
stated policy position of the APS is likely to be based on an unbiased evaluation of all 
pertinent available evidence.   The validity of assumption (b), however, is critical to 
arriving at conclusion (c), a point the layman should always bear in mind when trying to 
determine which side of a scientific controversy is the more credible. 
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3 Certainty of Experts vs Wisdom of Crowds 
Experts in a scientific controversy—no matter how many, how accomplished, or how 
much they may represent the consensus view of their professional organisations—can 
nevertheless be driven by considerations having less to do with contested principles of 
science than with a reward structure that is threatened by caution and regulation.  In that 
case assumption (b) above may not be valid, and “Follow the money” is still the most 
effective way to probe whether arguments presented by participants in a scientific 
controversy are scientific or self-serving. This reminder is especially fitting in the 
controversy over genetically modified (GM) food.      
 As recounted in MOD, the tactic used by tobacco and oil companies was to 
deceive the public into believing that the underlying science was too uncertain to warrant 
regulation.  In the case of GMO (O for organism) companies, however, the 
misrepresentation of the science is the reverse.  They claim the science is certain enough 
to assure the public that consequences of widespread commercial exploitations of gene-
manipulation technology are of negligibly low risk. Regrettably, the author of CSC has 
swallowed whole the industry’s line when he concluded [CSC p 239] 
 
Not all GMOs are sufficiently risk free to put on the market, but this provides 
very poor justification for prohibiting their development and distribution more 
generally.  
 
On the contrary, prevailing circumstances provide very adequate justification for 
constraining the development and general distribution of GMOs.   
 The promotional blurb on the back cover of CSC claims that, by “drawing on 
work in cognitive psychology, social epistemology, critical thinking, and philosophy of 
science,” the author shows readers how better to understand scientific controversy.  
Nevertheless, it is clear to at least the scientist writing this review that notwithstanding 
input from various “…ologies” and philosophy of science, the author’s critical thinking 
has disregarded the most important ethical principle underlying scientific research: the 
precautionary principle. That scientific research may entail risk is undeniable.  If it does, 
scientists are free to expose themselves to risk if they so choose, but they have no 
recognised right that I know of to expose others unknowingly or against their will to the 
same risk.  I am not a specialist in molecular genetics.  I am, however, a trained chemist 
as well as atomic and nuclear physicist.  I understand enough of the molecular biological 
literature to know that the artificial placement of genes in a genome and the prediction of 
the consequences of such placement, both for individuals and for ecosystems upon 
release of such organisms, are not well-enough understood to make reliable assurances of 
safety, especially in the long term.  
 Scientists who do research responsibly adhere to the precautionary principle.  I 
draw again on physics to provide an instructive, if not dramatic, example.  When, during 
the dire times of the Second World War, physicists of the Manhattan Project developed 
the “atom bomb”—i.e. bomb employing nuclear fission—no open-air test of the bomb 
was conducted until after careful theoretical analysis confirmed that detonation of such a 
bomb could not cause an atmospheric conflagration3.  (See, for example, the interview of 
                                                
3 The fear by some of the physicists was that nuclear fission in the atmosphere might generate a 
sufficiently high local temperature to induce large-scale nuclear fusion of hydrogen. 
Science & Education 26 (3) (2017) 397-405   DOI 10.1007/s11191-017-9886-2 
 The published article is available at:  http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11191-017-9886-2 
 
 7 
former Manhattan Project director and Nobel Laureate in Physics Arthur Holly Compton 
by author Pearl S Buck in her essay:  “The Bomb—The End of the World?”, American 
Weekly (8 March 1959) pp 8-9, 14.)   The probability of such an occurrence was believed 
to be very low—orders of magnitude lower, I would guess, than the occurrence of an 
ecological disaster from the release of GM products.  Nevertheless, even amidst the 
extreme wartime pressures to save lives and secure national survival, the first open-air 
test of the atomic bomb was not carried out until the possibility of catastrophic 
widespread destruction was excluded with a very high degree of certainty.  Compare that 
to the casual development and spread of GMOs and the insistence by GMO companies 
that GM foods not even be identifiable to the US public by labels. 
 Even in 1945 physicists could predict the interactions of quantum particles with 
greater certainty than biologists today can predict the activity of genes.  And yet, rather 
than confining experiments on genome modifications to indoor laboratories, GMO 
researchers and producers have grown products in open fields, facilitating the wide 
release of non-natural genetic material into the environment. There is no dire situation 
that justifies such haste and irresponsibility. The reason often given, to prevent global 
starvation, is a red herring.  Unrestricted dissemination of GM foods can never provide a 
stable food supply to an exponentially increasing human population.  Indeed, any 
company truly concerned with global starvation would utilise its resources better to 
devise humane ways to reduce human fertility and provide inexpensive methods of 
contraception.   Like controversies created by oil and tobacco companies, the motivation 
of GMO companies is really about money, a race for patents and profits. Only after 
controlled experimentation and a much more advanced predictive capacity of molecular 
genetics have established beyond reasonable doubt the long-term safety (both 
environmental and for human consumption) of GM products, should the dissemination 
(with labelling) of GMOs be permitted by regulatory agencies. 
 The controversies over climate change and GMOs, taken together, exhibit an 
interesting statistical asymmetry between the US public and the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) with an important philosophical lesson that the 
author of CSC has again missed.  First the asymmetry:  A recent publication by the PEW 
Research Center (Pew Research Center, January 29, 2015, “Public and Scientists’ Views 
on Science and Society”, p 37 http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/29/public-and-
scientists-views-on-science-and-society/) reported that  
(a)   the statement that climate change is mostly due to human activity is supported 
by 87% of AAAS scientists and 50% of US adults; 
(b)  the statement that GM foods are safe to eat is supported by 88% of AAAS 
scientists and 37% of US adults. 
Undoubtedly various opinions exist as to the cause of the large statistical discrepancy 
between the views held by the public and those held by AAAS scientists with respect to 
climate change and GM food safety.  Here is mine. 
 There is strong, palpable, diverse, positive evidence for climate change.  One sees 
it in physics (e.g. temperature measurements), in chemistry (e.g. atmospheric greenhouse 
gases), in geology (e.g. melting of glaciers and ice shelves), in biology (e.g. lengthening 
of growing seasons, temperature-driven relocations of animal and plant species, earlier 
emergence of insects) in numerous ways.  That is why statement (a) enjoys the greater 
public support.  In contrast, the best that GMO advocates might say is the double 
negative that there is no evidence to show that GM food is not safe.  Such an optimal 
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statement would in fact be untrue because evidence of problems with GM foods and the 
environmental dispersal of GMOs have been reported in scientific journals.  (See, for 
example, ( a )  A  D o n a  a n d  I  S  A r v a n i t o y a n n i s ,  2 0 0 9 ,  ”Health Risks of 
Genetically Modified Foods”, Critical Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition 49 164-
175; (b) F Zawide, “Emerging Risks of Genetically Modified Foods”, Environmental 
Health Perspectives, https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/isee/2016-p3-252-3494/.)  Moreover, as 
any “critical thinker” knows, such a double-negative statement provides no evidence that 
the statement “GM food is safe” is true. That may be why statement (b) is rejected by 
63% of the US adult population (assuming the PEW report is accurate).  The US public—
and add to that the publics of other countries in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere where 
imports of US GM products are banned—do not need a course in formal logic to sense 
the distinction between a position supported by strong evidence and a position argued on 
the basis of lack of evidence.  Given the perceived financial conflicts of interest, the 
public does not expect researchers and producers of GM products to look for, find, or 
divulge evidence of individual harm or ecological damage that would result in loss of 
profits. I am reminded of the well-known quote from Sinclair Lewis 
(https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Upton_Sinclair): “It is difficult to get a man to understand 
something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.” Just replace 
“understand” by “find” and “salary” by “company”.   
 Regarding the GMO controversy, the strong rejection by the public (of many 
nations) of the consensus of AAAS scientists (most of whom, I would surmise, are not 
experts in gene-manipulation technology) is not, in my opinion, another example of the 
societal trend, which I lamented at the start of this review, to reject science in general.   
Rather, it seems to me illustrative of a philosophically important state of affairs whereby 
the knowledge collectively demonstrated by a large number of nonspecialist individuals 
acting independently may at times be more reliable than the opinions expressed by 
experts.  Such a situation has been described anecdotally in The Wisdom of Crowds by 
business columnist James Surowiecki (Anchor, New York, 2004) and examined 
experimentally and quantitatively by me in “The Guesses of Groups” in my book A 
Certain Uncertainty.  There is, in fact, a rigorous mathematical relation concerning the 
guesses of groups that anyone concerned with the role of experts in scientific 
controversies might find philosophically thought-provoking. 
 The content of the relation, known as the “jury theorem”, can be expressed in a 
narrative form pertinent to the GMO controversy as follows.   Suppose a group of N non-
scientifically trained individuals are asked the question:  “Are GM foods safe to eat?”  
This is a question with a binary outcome, either “yes” (to be accorded +1) or “no” (to be 
accorded –1).  The members of the group are not specialists in molecular genetics, but 
neither are they necessarily totally ignorant; they can be assumed to read newspapers, 
listen to radio and television, talk with neighbours or colleagues at work.  In short, they 
are receptive to the flow of general information, however uncertain.   If, in response to 
the question, each member really had no idea of the correct answer and guessed 
randomly—i.e. with a probability of ½ or 50% for each outcome—the expected mean 
response of the group would be 0. In such a case, the group response would provide no 
information; there would be no “wisdom” in this crowd.   
 Now suppose, however, that each group member understood just enough about 
the question that the probability of his/her giving the correct answer was a very tiny 
amount !  (read: epsilon) better than ½ .  It might surprise the reader to learn that, despite 
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the great (but not total) uncertainty of each individual response, the mean response of the 
group will provide the correct answer to the question with a probability approaching 
virtual certainty, i.e. 100%, as the number N of respondents gets larger and larger.  For 
example, if the probability that a member makes a correct reply is just 51% (i.e. !  = 
0.01), it takes fewer than N = 14000 people for the group mean to provide the correct 
answer with a probability of 99%.   In the GMO controversy, the group size (various 
national publics) is in the many millions, compared with the much smaller number of 
GMO “experts”.  The resounding “No” to the question might well represent the wisdom 
of the crowd.  It is to be understood, of course, that the jury theorem is just a 
mathematical theorem; it follows rigorously from given assumptions.  Whether the 




4 Concluding Remarks 
In my 1992 article in this journal, I wrote of controversies over scientific principles with 
ramifications primarily confined to the scientific communities involved.  Whether 
continents moved or not, whether an asteroid caused mass extinctions 65 million years 
ago or not, whether matter was made of discrete atoms or not—the outcomes to these and 
other controversies hotly debated by participating scientists had little, if any, adverse 
effect on the general public.  However, the controversies such as discussed in MOD and 
CSC, where financial self-interest and political ideology play a large role, do impact 
public health, education, and safety in ways both immediate and long-term.  In these 
controversies, the methodology of real science—work carefully, work responsibly, 
acquire evidence thoroughly, and interpret it consistently—is disregarded so as to prevent 
or avoid regulatory action on behalf of the public.   It is very important in such cases of 
artificially contrived controversies (like climate change) or of rashly denied controversies 
(like GM food) for the public to understand as much as possible both the relevant 
scientific issues and the strategies employed for deception.   
From its style and content, Creating Scientific Controversies is primarily a book 
for academics, more appropriate perhaps as a one-semester lower-division philosophy 
textbook than for reading by the general public (in contrast to Merchants of Doubt) or by 
specialists with a professional philosophical or historical interest in controversial 
scientific issues.  Structurally, CSC is divided into three parts concerned respectively with 
the nature of science, the nature of argument, and the recognition of artificial 
controversies.  Considerably more than one half of this short book provided, in my 
opinion, little information or insight beyond what readers interested in the philosophy of 
science could obtain from other more discerning works.  In part three, which was the 
focal point of the book to judge from the preface and cover description, the author 
examined controversies relating to anthropogenic climate change, intelligent design, 
GMOs, AIDS, and autism.  From the fact that five controversies together comprising the 
most important content of the book occupied fewer than 70 out of 260 pages, the reader 
might well surmise that the examinations were somewhat superficial.   
Nevertheless, although there are opinions expressed by the author in CSC that I 
do not agree with, and issues that I believe the author should have thought through 
more carefully, the use of the book by a scientifically well-informed course instructor 
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could potentially help students recognise deceptive pseudo-scientific arguments when 
they encounter them.  I hope this will be the case, for I can think of few things more 
destructive to the long-term stability of a nation than the disregard of sound science in 
the implementation of public policy. 
 
______________________ 
Mark P Silverman is George A Jarvis Professor of Physics at Trinity College.  He conducts 
research in nuclear physics, statistical physics, and climate change.  His most recent books are A 
Certain Uncertainty: Nature’s Random Ways (2014) and And Yet It Moves: Strange Systems and 
Subtle Questions in Physics 2nd Ed (2015), both published by Cambridge University Press.  
Further information is available at www.mpsilverman.com and www.amazon.com/e/ 
B001HMOC5O.  
 
